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AN ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE CONSTRUCTIONS OF
THE REQUIREMENT THAT FEDERAL JURORS BE
COMPETENT UNDER STATE LAW
PRIOR to 1948 statutory provisions required federal court jurors to have
the same qualifications, and entitled them to the same exemptions, as jurors
in the highest court of the state in which the federal court convened.' This
procedure resulted in a complete lack of uniformity among federal juries since
state jury selection statutes vary widely, 2 sometimes giving judges or jury
commissioners wide discretion in disqualifying jurors.3 Furthermore, state
exemption statutes often eliminate those classes most likely to yield excellent
jurors.4 Therefore, statutory revision was proposed, not only to create uniform
qualifications for federal jurors, but also to avoid those state qualifications and
exemptions which made the selection of an intelligent jury difficult.5
1. "Jurors to serve in the courts of the United States in each State respectively, shall
have the same qualifications, subject to the provisions hereinafter contained, and be entitled
to the same exemptions, as jurors of the highest court of law in such State may have and
be entitled to at the time when such jurors for service in the courts of the United States
are summoned." 36 STAT. 1164 (1911), 28 U.S.C. § 411 (1946).
For the history of the old statute, see Hickey, Inprovenwnt of the Jur, Systcm in
Federal Courts, 35 GEo. L J. 50D (1947).
2. See R .cRT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERFNCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON SELECTIO; OF
JuROas 33 (1942) (hereinafter cited as JUDICIAL CONFRF_NcE). See also rA.;DEnD1LT,
MIN1,1Ms STANDAPDS OF JUDICIAL ADmINIsTRmAIox 163-80 (1949) (hereinafter cited as
'VANDERBILT) ; Hickey, supra note 1.
3. See, e.g., CoN. GE. STAT. § 2373 (Supp. 1953): "permanently disqualified for
jury service by reason of physical infirmities or otherwise." (Emphasis added.) See also
MicH. STAT. ANN. § 27.246 (1938) ". . . of good character, of approved integrity, of
sound judgment .... and free from all legal exceptions." The flexibility made possible
by such provisions is not inherently undesirable, but there is no reason why federal courts
should be bound by state court discretionary determinations.
4. State exemption statutes often reflect legislative reaction to pressure group activity.
JuDIcAL. CONFE NcE 33, 39. Many professional groups, especially doctors and lawyers,
are exempt from jury service in a large percentage of the states. JuLnczu. Co:.Fr.;cE
36-39; VA F.NRsiLT 172-81. So many high calibre classes are exempt that "in some states
exemption from jury service has become a badge of distinction." Wicker, Jury Panels in
Federal Courts, 22 T .N. L. REv. 203, 204 (1952).
5. The problem of federal jury selection %was subjected to intensive study by a com-
mittee of district judges appointed to conduct the investigation by the Conference of
Senior Circuit Judges in 1941. In September, 1942, the committee submitted its report.
JUDIcAL CONFERFNCF. The report was circulated to judges and bar associations for com-
ments and suggestions. The Judicial Conference met in 1943 and recommended the
adoption of the legislation which had been found advisable by the committee. The pru-
posed legislation called for uniform and liberal federal qualifications, with very few ex-
emptions, leaving the district judges a large degree of discretion in determining whether
or not individuals or classes should be subject to jury service. This resulted in the
introduction of Senate Bills 1623, 1624, 1625 in the Seventy-Eighth Congress. The reports
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In 1948, Congress enacted section 1861,0 which was intended to provide
uniform standards of qualifications for jurors in federal courts. 7 The statute
reads:
"Any citizen of the United States who has attained the age of 21 years
and resides within the judicial district is competent to serve as a grand
or petit juror unless:
"(1) He has been convicted in a state or federal court of a crime
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year and his civil
rights have not been restored by pardon or amnesty.
"(2) He is unable to read, write, speak, and understand the English
language.
"(3) He is incapable, by reason of mental or physical infirmities, to
render efficient jury service.
"(4) He is incompetent to serve as a grand or petit juror by the law
of the state in which the district court is held."
of the Judicial Conference for 1944, 1945, and 1946 contain a renewal of its recommenda-
tions in support of these bills. VANDERBILT 149-205; Hickey, supra note 1.
A major target of the attacks on state statutory, requirements was the exclusion of
women jurors. MOORE, COMMENTARY ON U.S. JUDICIAL CODE 373 (1949). This disquali-
fication because of sex, although steadily decreasing, is still operative in four states. In 1942
twenty states disqualified women from jury service. JUDICIAL CoNvxaERNc 34. By
1947, fourteen states still required only male jurors. VANDERBILT 166. The following state
statutes still allow only male jurors: AI.A. CODE tit. 30, § 21 (1940) ; Miss. CoDE § 1762
(1942); TEX. Civ. STAT. art. 2133 (Vernon 1925); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5261 (1949).
Many states exempt all women from jury duty; others allow women with children under
16 to claim exemptions. In Florida, women are qualified, but must register with the clerk
of the circuit court their desire to be placed on the jury list in order to be eligible. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 40.01 (1951). In Nebraska and Rhode Island women are ineligible in those
districts which have no accommodations for women jurors. NED. REv. STAT. § 25-1601.01
(1943); R.I. GEN. STAT. c. 506 § 37 (1938). In 1947 there were only 17 states where
women enjoyed precisely the same status as men. Fisher, Women as Jurors, 33 A.B.A.J.
113 (1947).
Another criticism of state statutes was that property requirements were among the
qualifications for jurors. See, e.g., MONT. RET. CODE ANN. § 93-1301 (1947); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 9-11 (1943). Furthermore, a number of states require jurors to be over 25. CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 7906 (1949); R.I. GEN. STAT. c. 506, § 1 (1938). Persons over 65 were
disqualified in some states even though they might make excellent jurors. Wvo. Co~mx.
STAT. ANN. § 12-101 (1945); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5261 (1949); S.C. CODE § 38-52
(1952). And some of the southern states, by limiting jurors to those qualified as electors,
require payments of poll tax to be eligible for jury service. Miss. CODE ANN. § 1762
(1942) ; see Myers v. State, 167 Miss. 76, 147 So. 308 (1933).
6. 62 STAT. 951 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1952).
7. The statute was part of a general revision of federal judicial procedure. The Re-
viser's note to § 1861 states:
"The revised section prescribes uniform standards of qualification for jurors in
Federal Courts instead of making qualifications depend upon State laws. This is
in accord with proposed legislation recommended by the Judicial Conference of
the United States.
"The last paragraph is added to exclude jurors incompetent to serve as jurors
in the state courts."
Emphasis has been added to the portion of the statute quoted in the text.
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It is clear that the original purpose of the statute is defeated by clause 4,8
which appears to require a federal jury commissioner to recognize at least
some state restrictions. The extent to which state requirements are to be followed
is confused by the use of the word "incompetent," seldom used in state
qualification statutes.9 Moreover, while the previous statute provided for
identical exemptions and qualifications in state and federal courts, the new
statute has separate sections setting up distinct federal qualifications,10 ex-
emptions,1 ' and excuses.12 Because of the uncertainty engendered by clause 4,
clarification of the statute is necessary to facilitate the work of federal judges
and jury commissioners. 13
& Clause 4 was not included in the proposed legislation recommended by Judicial Con-
ference. It is clear from the activities of the Conference after the passage of § 1861 that
clause 4 is not in harmony with its desire for federal uniformity. See note 44 infra. There
is no mention in any hearing, report, or debate to explain why it was thought necessary to
include clause 4. Similarly, there is no indication in the legislative history of what effect
Congress felt clause 4 would have on the rest of § 1861.
9. A majority of the states speak in terms of "qualifications," "exemptions," and
"excuses." But see CA. CODE CIv. PROC. §§ 193, 199 (1949) ("competency"); Ou-. Rv.
STAT. § 10.030 (1953) (same); TLx. STAT. AN. art. 2135 (1923) (same).
10. 62. STAT. 951 (1948), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861(1), (2), (3) (1952). See text at note
6 supra.
11. 62 STAT. 952 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (1952):
"Exemptions
"The following persons shall be exempt from jury service
"(1) Members in active service in the armed forces of the United States.
"(2) Members of the Fire or Police department of any State, District, Territory,
or Possession or subdivision thereof.
"(3) Public officers in the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of the govern-
ment of the United States, or any State, District, Territory, or Possession or subdivision
thereof who are actively engaged in the performance of official duties."
12. 62 STAT. 952 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1863 (1952):
"Exclusion or excuse from service
"a) A district judge for good cause may excuse or exclude from jury service any
person called as a juror.
"b) Any class or group of persons may, for the public interest, be excluded from the
jury panel or excused from service as jurors by order of the district judge based on a
finding that such jury service would entail undue hardship, extreme inconvenience, or
serious obstruction or delay in the fair and impartial administration of justice.
"c) No citizen shall be excluded from service as a grand or petit jurur in any court
of the United States on account of race or color."
13. To secure information on this subject an inquiry was sent to all federal district
court clerks, asking them to explain their current practices in selecting federal jurors. It
was hoped, by this means, to determine the extent to which the federal jury selection
system is affected by state laws, and to measure the changes in the selection process since
the 1.948 revision. The 40 replies received indicated clearly that confusion exists in this field
due to the vagueness of the current statute. The replies will be cited hereinafter as Con-
fidential Communications to Yale Law Jounial.
A separate problem is whether or not clause 4 incorporates any or all state causes for
challenge. This question is beyond the scope of the instant note which is concerned
only with the problems facing federal judges and jury commissioners in selecting proper
jury panels, and not with questions concerning the propriety of a juror in a particular
case.
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Most state statutes speak in terms of "qualifications" and "exemptions"
rather than in terms of "competency." There are two categories of state
qualifications. The more common and important one includes the specific,
objectively determinable, basic qualifications, such as age, residence, sex, and
education.14 The second category embraces discretionary qualifications. These
include both "moral" and "reputation" requirements as well as more general
"fitness" qualifications which allow the judge or jury commissioner to declare
a person ineligible without more detailed statutory justification.1 Three types
of exemptions exist. Many state statutes require exempted classes to claim
their exemptions.' 6 Other statutes provide for automatic exemptions which
strike certain classes from jury lists without their request.' 7 And still other
statutes authorize courts or jury commissioners to excuse individuals in specific
cases for hardship or extreme inconvenience. 18 Finally, some statutes defy
classification, since they can be construed as creating either qualifications or
exemptions.' 9
Clause 4 is susceptible of a number of interpretations. The safest but most
restrictive approach for the jury commissioner is to declare "incompetent" all
those who are either disqualified or exempt under state law for whatever
reason. 20 However, this view would render virtually meaningless the language
14. Although they are not uniform throughout the states, every state has some basic
statutory requirements. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. c. 78-1-1(1) (1953) ; ILL. STAT. ANN.
c. 78, §§ 2(1), (2), (3) (Supp. 1954) ; VA. CODE § 8-174 (Supp. 1954).
15. See supra note 3. See also, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 78, § 2(4) (Supp. 1954);
VT. REV. STAT. § 1586 (1947).
16. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. cc. 78-1-3, 78-1-7, 78-1-8 (1953) ; TEX. REv. STAT. art.
2137 (Vernon 1925).
17. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7927 (1949); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 78, § 4 (Supp.
1954). See also People ex rel. Elliot v. Wallace, 247 Ill. App. 489 (1.928) ; OR. Rxv. STxAr.
§§ 10.130 (1953) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1092 (1930). In these states exemptions
often have the same effect as disqualifications because the only way an exempt person
might get an opportunity to serve would be specifically to waive his exemption. Even when
exemptions must be claimed, jury commissioners often withhold or delete the names of
persons who might claim exemptions.
Some state statutes do not clearly indicate whether the exemption is automatic or
whether it must be claimed. See, e.g., CAI. CODE Civ. PRoc. §§ 200, 202 (1950).
18. See, e.g., ORE. REV. STAT. § 10.050 (1953); Onio GEN. CODE ANN. § 11419-18
(1938).
19. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 609.2 (1954) which declares "ineligible" any person "who
has been exempted by law from jury service." Query whether such persons are disqualified
or merely exempt. See also note 29 infra.
20. A majority of the federal districts seem to have adopted this construction. 60% of
replies to our questionnaires indicated that the federal courts were still following state statutes
on qualifications and exemptions. Confidential Communications to Yal' Law Journal. This
number may not, however, be a completely accurate reflection of the number of courts
which feel bound by this construction, since some may have adopted state exemptions as
a matter of discretion. See 28 U.S.C. § 1863, note 12 supra. It is interesting to note,
however, that only one federal district clerk felt that there had been anything more than




of the rest of the section, since practically all state statutes encompass the re-
quirements in the preceding three clauses. Moreover, such a construction
seems inconsistent with certain other provisions of Title 28. For example, a
section on exemptions, section 1862,21 was enacted simultaneously with section
1861. Thus, it would seem that the status of those persons previously exempt
because of state statutes should no longer be determined by section 1861, but
should be resolved exclusively by section 1862.22 Possibly the strongest objec-
tion to this restrictive approach is that it activates all the rigid requirements
of state law and hampers the choice of a well equipped jury, thus preserving
the disadvantages of the old statute.
Perhaps the most defensible interpretation of section 1861(4) is that it in-
corporates all state qualifications, but no state exemptions. 23 This is supported
by the inclusion of clause 4 in a section which is entitled "Qualifications,"
and which lists minimum federal requirements. Furthermore, the word "com-
petent" is used in the first sentence of the section, apparently as a synonym
for "qualified." 24 This construction would allow the federal jury commissioner
to select jurors who would have been exempted under the old statute, but it
would retain the disadvantages inherent in federal incorporation of state quali-
fications. Furthermore, the commissioner would still be faced with the problem
of differentiating between qualifications and exemptions.2 Most states, for
instance, have statutes temporarily disqualifying or exempting persons who
have served on a jury in either the same state or the same court in which they
are now potential jurors.20 Some states, apparently basing their prohibition on
a reluctance to burden the citizen with more than his share of duties, provide
21. See note 11 supra. A similar argument can be made with respect to the section on
exclusions. See note 12 stpra.
22. It would appear that Congress, by adding its own section on exemptions, intended
to preclude the continued use of state exemptions. On the other hand, it might be argued
that the federal statute on exemptions was merely to be used in addition to state exemp-
tions and that the state exemptions are still encompassed in federal regulations by clause 4.
It would seem logical, on the other hand, that if Congress meant to incorporate state
exemptions, it would have stated so in the exemption statute rather than in the section
for qualifications.
23. About 35% of the federal districts are following this practice. Con fidenial
Conmnunications to Yale Law Journal. In addition, a substantial numbir of jury com-
misioners may feel bound only by state qualifications, but follow state exemptions because
of tradition and practice. See note 20 supra. Dean Wicker, of the Tennessee College
of Law, who is also jury commissioner for the Northern Division of the Eastern District
of Tennessee, has adopted this construction of § 1861. Wicker, Jury Pastels in Fcdcral
Courts, 22 TmNN. L. Rny 204, 207 (1952). One reply indicated that a district judge felt
that § 1861 required him to exempt those people disqualified under state law. If the ex-
emption was automatic this might have the same effect as a disqualification. See note
17 supra.
24. See text at note 6 supra.
25. See note 19 supra.
26. Although almost every state has some prior service provision, they vary widely as
to the prior period covered, the courts included in the provision, and the effect of such
prior service (disqualification, exemption, or cause for challenge). VA.nv.tL'r 170 n.73.
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for an exemption for those with prior jury service.2 7 Other states appear to
have enacted the provision to protect litigants against "professional jurors,"
and disqualify persons with prior service.28 In some states, however, the effect
of the prior service statute is unclear, and the jury commissioner may be faced
with the difficult problem of deciding whether a potential juror is exempt or
disqualified.2
9
A third possibility would be to construe "incompetent" to cover only basic
qualifications.30 This would be a reasonable construction of clause 4 since the
three preceding clauses of section 1861 similarly deal only with basic qualifica-
tions. And this approach would allow federal jury commissioners to disregard
state discretionary qualifications,3 ' a practice which would be especially desir-
able where state commissioners and judges can arbitrarily disqualify a person
without specific statutory guidance.32 Furthermore, state exemptions would
also be ignored.
27. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 39-224 (1947); MASS. ANN. LAWS C. 234, § 2
(1932). See Commonwealth v. De Stasio, 297 Mass. 347, 8 N.E.2d 923 (1937). See also
Blume, Jury Selection Analyzed 42 MicH. L. REv. 831, 840 (1944).
28. See Miss. CODE § 1762 (1942); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5264 (1949) ; Blume, supra
note 27, at 836.
Prior service in a federal court within a year is ground for challenge according to the
federal statutory provision. 62 STAT. 953 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1869 (1952). This does
not immunize the federal commissioners from the state provisions incorporated by §
1861(4). Yet it could be argued that Congress, by making prior service only a ground for
challenge, expressed its intent that such service shall not be an absolute disqualification.
See Papernow v. Standard Oil Co., 228 Fed. 399 (D.R.I. 1915). A New York clerk stated
that his practice was to disregard a three year prior service statute since it was his
conclusion that § 1869 was controlling and that the federal courts were not bound by state
prior service provisions. Confidential Communications to Yale Law Journal.
Many "professional jurors" make excellent jurors since they are genuinely interested
and have ample time to serve. They are often alert elderly people whose previous jury
experience is an asset for their present service. A number of jury commissioners would
like to accept these jurors but find the state limitations insurmountable.
29. In Connecticut, for example, the statute provides that the jury list shall not include
the name of any person who has "been a member of a regular jury panel and as such
has actually served as a juror more than once within five years previous to the date of
said list." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 2376c (Supp. 1953). There is no certain way of determiu-
ing whether this provides for an exemption or a disqualification. But cf. McCarten v.
Connecticut Co., 103 Conn. 537, 542 (1925). Yet the federal jury commissioner in that
district must, because of caution, exclude such persons from federal jury service, even
though he does not recognize state exemptions as binding on the federal system.
In North Dakota a provision states that "no governing body of any subdivision shall
select therefrom any person to serve as a juror who has served on the regular panel as a
juror from such subdivision during the preceding ten years." N.D. Ray. CoD § 27-0909
(1943). There is no indication as to whether this is an exemption or disqualification.
30. In United States v. Foster, 83 F. Supp. 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), the only decision
which has considered clause 4, Judge Medina held that the clause embraces the basic
qualifications. However, he was not concerned with, and consequently left unanswered,
the extent to which clause 4 incorporates state exemptions and discretionary qualifications.
31. For examples of such discretionary qualifications, see note 3 supra.
32. Allowing federal commissioners to disregard state discretionary regulations would
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The final alternative is for the jury commissioner to construe clause 4 in its
narrowest sense. Juror "competency" is used by many authorities to describe
something quite apart from juror "qualifications." These writers employ
"competency" to refer to a juror's fitness to act in a particular case, as distin-
guished from the qualifications necessary for jury duty in generalVa3 Defining
terms in this fashion would enable a jury commissioner to disregard all state
qualifications and exemptions. Only state rules concerning sucl matters as
ineligibility because of bias or interest in a particular case would then have any
effect on federal juries. These rules are substantially uniform, 4 and allow the
trial judge to exercise a large degree of discretion.35 However, this interpreta-
tion seems unrealistic, since, in effect, it reads clause 4 out of section 1861.
In addition, the words "incompetent" and "disqualified" are frequently used
have a twofold effect. First, it would relieve the federal jury commissioner of any possible
duty to respect, as binding, disqualifications because of such vague criteria as "esteem in
the community" or "reputation for honesty," when these are found lacking by state
officials. This is especially significant in those instances where the federal jury commis-
sioner uses the state jury lists to assemble federal jurors. In these cases those disqualified
for such matters could, under this interpretation, be reinstated on the federal list. Secondly,
where the federal jury commissioner compiles his own list, he would no longer be troubled
by the possible obligation to fulfill state discretionary requirements. This is especially
significant in large districts where the commissioner cannot be expected to check person-
ally on the jury candidates. See, e.g., Vr. REv. STAT. § 15S6 (1947) ("mentally, morally,
and physically qualified"). See also FA. STA.T. ANN. § 40.01 (1943). This statute
provides for "basic' qualifications under the heading "General qualifications" and "General
disqualifications." Section 40.01(3) is titled "Duty of persons selecting jury lists" and
provides:
"In selection of jury lists only such persons as the selecting officers kmow, or
have reason to believe, are'law abiding citizens of approved integrity, good character,
sound judgment and intelligence, and who are not physically or mentally infirm,
shall be selected for jury duty."
33. Most legal writers use the words in this sense. 8 VoRs AND Pnr.%sES 357 (1951)
has two definitions under "competent juror." The first is from Mount v. Welsh, 118 Ore.
568, 247 Pac. 815 (1926). It defines a "competent juror" as "one who is impartial and
indifferent as to the parties and cause." The second excerpt, from Whitehead v. State,
97 Miss. 537, 52 So. 259 (1910), finds a juror competent if he "may fairly be supposed
to yield to the testimony and leave the mind open to a fair consideration thereof . . .
Similarly, in the VEST's DIGESTS, "Qualifications of Jurors and Exemptions" are outlined
in one chapter, Jury, c. III, whereas "competency" is listed in another chapter together vith
challenges and objections, Jury, c. V, and refers to cases where the juror is beipg ques-
tioned concerning his ability to serve in a particular case. 50 C.J.S., Juries §3 134-53
(1947) discusses "qualifications and exemptions." It refers to race, color, sex:, physical
capacity, age, intelligence, etc. In 50 CJ.S., Juries § 208(a) (1947), competency is
described as follows: "The term, 'competency,' as applied to jurors, and as used in the
following sections, relates to their fitness to act as such in a particular case, as distin-
guished from the qualifications necessary for jury duty in general"
34. Compare, e.g., N.Y. CGM. CODE § 376, uith MIN.,; STAT. A.zx. § 631.30 (1947)
and VA. CoDE § 8-199 (1950).
35. See United States v. Sferas, 210 F.2d 69 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 935
(1954) ; Acree v. State, 153 Fla. 561, 15 So. 2d 262 (1943) ; State v. Grillo, 16 N.J. 103,
106 A.2d 294 (1954) ; Moore v. Middlewest Freightways, 266 SAV2d 578, 585 (Mo. 19541
(dictum).
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interchangeably by courts and legislators.30 Furthermore, the inclusion of
clause 4 in a section on qualifications and the use of "competent" earlier in the
section indicate that this construction is probably not consistent with Congres-
sional intent.37 But courts could point to a change in terminology from the
previous statute as an indication that Congress used the term consciously aware
of its unique meaning. Since Congress had not used the word "competent" in
any previous statute, yet saw fit to use it in section 1861, it would be logical to
infer that the legislators wanted to express a meaning different from the one
conveyed by the term "qualifications," which they continued to use in its old
sense. Moreover, the legislative history of the statute indicates Congress' intent
to establish uniform federal qualifications and exemptions. 3 8
Since the meaning of section 1861 (4) has not yet been crystallized by court
decisions,3 9 a major problem facing the jury commissioner is the degree of
discretion which he can exercise in compiling the jury list. On the one hand,
he should be conservative in his selection since, especially in a large district, it
would be wasteful to have potential jurors incur the time and expense of com-
ing to the courtroom, only to be disqualified by the trial judge.40 On the other
hand, it is relatively safe for the commissioner to gamble against a possible
reversal of a verdict on the grounds of an improperly selected jury. Irregu-
larities in the qualifications of jurors are generally waived by a failure to make
a timely challenge.41 And even if the question of qualification of jurors is
36. See, e.g., Ford v. United States, 201 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Moore v. State,
197 Ind. 640, 151 N.E. 689 (1926) ; Tollackson v. City of Eagle Grove, 203 Iowa 696, 213
N.W. 222 (1927). See also note 9 supra.
37. See text at note 6 supra. If clause 4 were only meant to incorporate state
statutes dealing with bias or interest in a particular case it would more properly belong in
28 U.S.C. § 1870, see note 52 infra, which gives federal judges discretionary powers to
rule on disqualification for "cause or favor." It could furthermore be argued that by
putting clause 4 among a number of qualification statutes Congress clearly implied that
it was to be interpreted as a qualification requirement.
38. See notes 7-8 supra and accompanying text.
Since the fourth alternative is at least a rational interpretation, courts would seem
on safe ground in construing "competency" in its narrowest sense. See notes 41-43
infra and accompanying text. A jury commissioner, however, would be somewhat fool-
hardy to accept jurors who would be disqualified in the state courts, since most federal
judges will probably refuse to accept this interpretation and will disqualify jurors dis-
qualified under state statutes.
39. judge Medina's opinion, the only one in the field, does little to clarify the statute.
See note 30 supra.
40. "Federal jurors often live a hundred miles from the Federal court. They receive
seven cents a mile and seven dollars a day for their services. Thus monetary and lost time
considerations make imperative in the Federal court system a careful, cautious selection
of those best qualified, and the elimination of the obviously incompetent, undesirable and
unfit prior to the deposit of names in the jury box." Wicker, fury Panels in Federal
Courts, 22 TENN. L. Rav. 203, 212 (1952). The loss of time by the court and the litigating
parties is an implicit factor in the above statement.
41. Where the objection to a juror relates to a statutory disqualification (propter
defectum) rather than to actual prejudice or bias (propter affectum), the disqualification
is ordinarily waived by failure to assert it until after the verdict. Qucenan v. Oklahoma,
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litigated at trial, appellate courts will be reluctant to reverse a verdict if no
actual bias is shown.4 The inclusion of a juror properly exempt can never
be challenged by a litigating party.43
Although courts and jury commissioners can ameliorate the effects of clause
4 on section 1861 by adopting a narrow construction, it is higl-dy improbable
that they can completely obviate its disadvantages. Only legislative repeal
can eliminate the confusion which now attends clause 4's application:." Even
more important, abolition of the clause would allow uniform regulation of jury
selection for the federal courts. This would be a logical extension of the policy
underlying the Uniform Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure.Z
190 U.S. 548 (1903). The disqualification is waived even though the facts which constitute
it were not previously known to the appellant. Ford v. United States, 201 F2d 300, 301
(5th Cir. 1953); Brewer v. Jacob, 22 Fed. 217 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1884).
42. See federal statutes on harmless error. FFn. R. Cram. P. 52(a):
"Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights
shall be disregarded."
FED. R. Civ. P. 61:
"[N]o error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the
court or by any of the parties is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside
a verdict . . . unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent
w ith substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard
any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights
of the parties."
There are a number of states which have specific provisions declaring that service
on a jury of a person disqualified from service under state provisions shall not of itself
vitiate any indictment found on a verdict rendered by such a jury unless actual injury to
the complaining party be proved. See, c.g., N.M. STAT. AmN. § 19-1-2 (1953); Ann.
STAT. ANN. § 39-115 (1947). These statutes are not binding on the federal courts, how-
ever, since such questions are controlled by common law rather than state statutury law.
Strang v. United States, 53 F2d 820 (5th Cir. 1951).
Trial judges have always been given a great deal of discretion in their rulings on
juror competency. United States v. Sferas, 210 F2d 69, 75 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 935 (1954); Bratcher v. United States, 49 F2d 742, 745 (4th Cir.), cert. denicd,
325 U.S. 885 (1945).
43. An exemption is a personal privilege and can never be asserted or questioned
by anyone but the exempted party. Nick v. United States, 122 F2d 660, 670 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 687 (1941); White v. United States, 16 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1926),
cert. denied, 274 U.S. 745 (1927).
44. A bill was introduced in the Eighty-Third Congress sponsored by the Judicial Con-
ference to repeal clause 4, but was indefinitely postponed. Hearings Before Subcommilttee of
the Senate Committee onL the Judiciary on Uniform Qualifications for Jurors, 83d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1953). The bill has not been re-introduced in the present sussion of Congress.
Replies from about half of the nation's district courts showed that there wecre at lkast
five interpretations of § 1861(4) in use at the present time. 60f,% of the districts follow
state exemptions and qualifications. See note 20 supra. 35q feel buund only by state qualifica-
tions. One court exempts those persons disqualified by state provision. See nute 23 supra.
Another district seems to follow only state exemptions and disregards state qualifications.
Finally, two districts respect neither state qualifications nor exemptions. Confidential
Cownnunications to Yale Law Journal.
45. JuDIcIA.L CoNr-a-aNcE 40; testimony of Knox, Hcarings Before House Committee
on the Judiciary on H.R. 3379, 3380, 3381, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1945).
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Opponents of federal uniformity claim that it is undesirable because it would
destroy the congruency which now exists in certain states between federal and
state juries.4 6 This may be important when litigants can choose between
federal and state courts. Even when the two systems had absolutely identical
requirements for jurors, there were advantages in choosing one over the other
because of practical differences in the process of selection.4 7 The imposition
of totally different federal regulations, it is argued, would aggravate the prob-
lem. However, section 1861 effects an unfortunate compromise between the
desire for federal uniformity, and for the advantages of intra-state consistency.
Not only is federal uniformity frustrated by clause 4, but because of the vague-
ness of the statute there is no assurance of uniformity between state and
federal courts within a state.48 In any event, diversity between the two court
systems is not too great a price to pay for federal uniformity, since the con-
tinued imposition of outmoded and arbitrary state requirements on the federal
jury process prevents the selection of the most capable jury available.40
Finally, if clause 4 were abolished, the trial judge would be given more
freedom to decide upon qualifications, exemptions, and challenges.8 0° He now
enjoys considerable discretion in excusing and excluding jurors under section
1863,r" and in ruling on the challenges of litigants under section 1870.52 Yet,
46. About 65% of the federal district clerks feel that the advantages of federal uni-
formity outweigh the usefulness of intra-state uniformity. Those who thought that uni-
formity within the two systems in a state should be preserved gave two reasons. The
inequity of having a differently chosen jury in the federal system, which may arrive at
a different verdict than one reached by a state court on a similar set of facts, was the
primary reason given by the clerks. Others indicated the simplicity achieved by preserving
similar practices as their reason for perferring intra-state uniformity. Confidential Com-
inunications to Yale Law Journal.
47. VANDERBILT 150; Potts, Desirability of the Federal System of Selection of Jury,
in IDAiao STATE BAR Ass'N, PROCmINGS 58, 59 (1926) ; Stayton, Report Upon Federal
and State Jury Questionnaire, 17 Tx. L. REv. 62 (1938).
48. In about 40% of the states, federal courts are not now utilizing state requirements
in the selection of jurors. Moreover, in at least 4 states, the practices among the various
federal courts within the states differ in respect to the adoption of state requirements.
Confidential Communications to Yale Law Journal.
49. "Conformity with state practice in both qualifications and exemptions sometimes
disqualified or exempted precisely the classes needed to restore the usefulness and prestige
of the jury system. Disqualifying or exempting highly qualified classes has the effect of
seriously decreasing the reservoir of superior jurors. Wicker, Jury Panel in Federal
Courts, 22 TENN. L. Rxv. 203, 204 (1952). See also JUDIcIAL CONFERENCE 40, 41.
50. If clause 4 were abolished, only the very few federal qualifications and exemptions
would remain, and the broad compulsory requirements and exemptions enacted by state
statutes would be replaced by a discretionary power in federal trial courts to grant such relief.
If these courts find any state rules to be advantageous, they can apply them on a voluntary
basis. A number of district court judges feel that they are not bound by state exemptions,
yet apply them as a matter of discretion. Confidential Ccnn nnications to Yale Law
Journal.
51. See note 12 supra.
52. 62 STAT. 953 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1870(2) (1952) : "All challenges for cause or




if state regulations are encompassed by section 1861 (4), these functions would
be governed in great detail by state statutes. The advantages of the flexibility
inherent in allowing district judges to make ad hoc decisions on these matters
would seem easily to outweigh the danger of judicial abuse.0
There have been an increasing number of proposals for the reform or
abolition of the jury systemY4 Repeal of section 1861(4) would improve the
quality of federal juries and would be a significant step towards elimination of
some of the defects emphasized by these critics.
53. The advisability of allowing a great deal of judicial discretion is not necessarily
linked with the issue of federal uniformity. Although the Judicial Conference felt that
wider discretion was one advantage to be gained by a new uniformity statute, there are
some who advocate federal uniformity with qualifications and exemption provisions not
permitting wide discretion on the part of the trial judge. See Blume, Jury Selection
Analyzed: Proposed Rcvision of Federal System, 42 Isca. L REv. 831, S62 (1944).
54. See, e.g., FRANK, CouRTs ox TRIAL CC. VIII, IX (1949) ; Fruazx, LMw AxD TuE
MoDERN MixN 181 (1930); Duane, Civil Jury Should be Abolished, 12 Am. JVD. Soc. J.
137 (1930); Galston, Civil Jury Trials and Tribulations, 29 A.B.A.J. 195 (1943); Hoff-
man & Bradley, Jurors on Trial, 17 Mo. L. REv. 235 (1952).
